FUNDAMENTACIÓN ECONÓMICA DEL DERECHO DE PROPIEDAD PRIVADA E INGENIERÍA JURÍDICA DEL INTERCAMBIO IMPERSONAL.

Abstract

Economic growth requires private property rights, but private property rights are not always possible, because they mean starting-up and management costs. Therefore, for certain resources, what is needed is community ownership or, in borderline cases, free public access. Both community ownership and free public access are inefficient ways of utilising resources. The costs therefore must be reduced efficiently. In an impersonal society full of information asymmetry, maintaining the rule of unlimited recoverability of possession necessitates a trade-off between the security and the liquidity of property rights. This trade-off makes it difficult for property rights to perform their intended function. In real property, it takes state intervention to achieve a solution beyond the trade-off; this can be done by making the transfer system public through the introduction of a title registration system. If, to the contrary, a recording system is introduced, the trade-off can be palliated, but it will still exist. This hampers the expansion of private ownership as the system for utilising scarce resources.